tion laws, through the exclusion and deportation of aliens. would prevent or curtail alien access to employment opportunities in our labor markets. Thus, our immigration laws are a substantial barrier to the free flow of alien labor into the United States.
For example, we require "labor certification" for most categories of employment-based immigration visas, including those fo r skilled workers, even workers holding advanced degrees.<) Labor certifica tion requires, among other things, that the employer show that ·'there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified ... and available" to perform the work in question.111 By "qualified," our immigration laws generally mean minimally qualified.11 Thus. our laws mandate that employers choose any minimally qualified U.S. worker over any better qualified alien. 1 2 Through our immigration laws, we deny aliens access to valuable employment opportunities that are open to natives. At a fundamental level, these laws are at odds with antidiscrimination principles we take for granted in other contextsY This government mandated employment discrimination is espe cially striking given the basis for the discrimination. Most aliens are born aliens because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens based on immutable characteristics, including the geographic location of their birth and the citizenship of their parents at the time of their birth. 1 -1 For a liberal society that declares that "all men are created equal,"15 this discrimination, based explicitly on circumstances of lJ. !d.�� 11 :'3(h)(2)-(3). 11K2(a)(5)( 0).
!d.� llK2(a)(5)(A)(i).
ll. The statute requires the U.S. worker to he "equally qualified . . only 111 the case of an alien who .. is a member of the teaching profession . . or "has exceptiona l ability in the sciences or the arts ... M s 1182(a)(5)(A)(ii). 12. See STEPHEN H. LEGOiv!SKY. liv!iv!!GRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY IS) (2d cd. llJlJ7) ( .. [T] he employer ordinarily must hire a minimally qualified American ove r a more qualified alien (or hire no one at all) . . . ). (setting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth . . ).
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As the foc us ol this article IS an evaluation of U.S. immigration policies . my analysis examines the tension bet\1.een these policies and the ideals of equality and neutrality that we generally espouse lfl the United St<Hes \Vi thin our liberal political philosophy. I do not address the question of whether other societies must also live by the same principles to which we are committed . as that issue IS beyond the scope of this article. See birth, is at odds with ideal principles of social justice. 1 h Our liberal ideals raise a presumption in favor of equal treatment and place the burden on those who defend discrimination to come forward with a justification for discriminatory laws.
The discrimination based on nativity in our nationality laws would be less important if it were a simple matter for an alien to gain permanent residence in the United States and then naturalize. Once an alien immigrates and gains lawful permanent residence, the alien becomes a U.S. worker with access to the U.S. labor market and eventually access to U.S. citizenship.17 Our immigration laws, how ever, raise significant barriers to immigration and thereby deny the vast majority of aliens access to the employment opportunities provided to U.S. natives as a birthright. Insofar as these hurdles prevent most aliens who desire such access from enjoying the oppor tunities open to U.S. natives, they discriminate against those who are born aliens in favor of those natives. The more restrictive our immi gration and naturalization policies. the more significance they confer on nationality at birth, and the more our laws discriminate based on circumstances of birth.
In Part I of this Article, I examine our immigration restrictions in light of our liberal ideals of equality. I argue that these ideals require us to extend equal concern to all individuals and that this cosmopoli tan perspective makes it difficult to justify our immigration restric tions. This violation of the principle of equal concern represents one sense in which immigration restrictions violate our liberal ideals.
In Part IL I assume a less demanding moral theory, which allows us to give the interests of natives priority over the interests of aliens. I argue that even from this parochial perspective, it is diffi cult to justify the employment discrimination implied by our immigration restrictions as ideal policies unless we count the satisfaction of segregationist preferences as a justification. The role of intolerance in explaining the adoption of immigration restrictions underscores the second sense in which the employment discrimination implied by our immigration policies violates our liberal ideals. 
2003] /i\l!t'vi!CRA TION AND THE WORKPLA CE
In Part III, I explore the normative implications of my analysis for the reform of our immigration policies. I conclude that it is difficult for us to justify employment discrimination against aliens from a liberal perspective, whether we adopt the cosmopolitan perspective or a less egalitarian perspective that allows us to favor the interests of natives over those of aliens. The interests of natives, however, may justify some restrictions on alien access to public benefits and to citizenship, which would suggest liberalized guest worker programs as a component of immigration reform. These programs would not be ideal from the cosmopolitan liberal perspec tive, but then neither would our current immigration restrictions. I argue that guest-worker programs would represent a non-ideal, second-best improvement over the status quo from a cosmopolitan perspective, given constraints that make more ideal policies politically infeasible. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some concluding remarks.
I.

THE LIBERAL IDEAL AND THE COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE
Consider the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls. who asks what principles people would choose behind a "veil of ignorance. "IK In this "original position," people know nothing about their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations. "IY This condition ensures that the parties are "fairly situated and treated equally as moral persons, " 21 1 or as Ronald Dworkin describes, extends ''equal concern and respect" to each indi vid ual.:?1 Using Rawls' theory, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immi gration restrictions as a question of social justice.2 2 In seeking a justification for the exclusion of aliens, "we don't want to be biased by self-interested or partisan considerations'' and instead "can take it as a basic presupposition that we should treat all human beings. not just members of our own society, as fr ee and equal moral persons. If we begin with equal concern for all persons. then immigration barriers are morally suspect and demand justification. All immigra tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their alienage. which in turn derives from immutable characteristics such as birthplace (that is. national origin) and other circumstances of birth such as parentage .211 National origin would appear to be a trait that Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."27 Carens concludes that we cannot justify restrictions ''on the grounds that those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born elsewhere or of alien parents.''2�' Nor can we justify restrictions "on the grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-being of current citizens. "2l) Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global welfare, ·'current citizens would enjoy no privileged position. " 111 A.
Immigration Restrictions and Global Economic Welfare
Suppose we adopt the perspective of a global utilitarian and thus give equal weight to the welfare of each individual in the world. Can we then justify the employment discrimination mandated by our immigration laws? Perhaps this unequal treatment for aliens is somehow consistent with equal concern for the interests of each individuaP1 An economic analysis of the welfare effects of immigra- tion restrictions, however, indicates that these barriers to labor migration not only reduce global wealth but also increase inequality in its distribution worldwide. These barriers are neither economically efficient nor equitable.
Consider the economic effects of labor migration in world labor markets. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage countries to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a result of this migration, world output rises. Higher wages in the host country imply that the marginal product of labor is higher there than in the source country. That is, higher wages for the same worker mean that the worker produces more value in the host country than in the source country. Labor migration generally leads to net gains in wealth for the world as a whole, because labor flows to the country where it has the higher value use.12 An efficient global labor market would allow labor to move freely to the country where it earns the highest return. Market forces would thus direct labor to the market where its mar ginal product is highest. For this reason, economic theory raises a presumption in favor of the free movement of labor.
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor inter nationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of labor to diverge widely among different countries.'' For any given class of labor, residents of high-wage countries could gain by employing more immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain by selling more of their labor to employers in high-wage countries. Immigration restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a misallocation of labor among countri es, thereby wasting human resources and creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant countries.
The larger the inequality in wages between countries. the large r the distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restric tions, and the larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor migration. Given the large international differences in wages. it should be apparent that the potential gains from liberalized labor migration (and the costs that the world bears as a result of immigra tion barriers) are huge. In fact. some economists have attempted to estimate the gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing migra tion. These studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from removing immigration barriers could well be enormous and greatly exceed the gains from removing trade barriers. For example, Bob Hamilton and John Whalley provide a range of estimates based on various assumptions about critical parameters, but all of their esti mates suggest that the potential gains are large.J-l Many of their estimates suggest that the gains from free migration of labor would more than double worldwide real income.35 Even their most conserva tive estimate suggests that the gains would be a significant fraction (more than 13 percent) of worldwide real income.3ti Furthermore , their analysis indicates that the free migration of labor would also greatly improve the global distribution of income by raising real wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers.-'7
Given these welfare effects, the employment discrimination im plied by immigration restrictions are difficult to defend in terms of the cosmopolitan liberal ideal. This ideal would extend the principle of equal concern expressed by Rawls' original position to all persons. Carens and others conclude from these liberal premises that "we have an obligation to open our borders much more fully than we do now."3s
B. Justice and the Alien
Some theorists have questioned the application of Rawls' origi nal position to the international context. Rawls himself assumes that the '·boundaries" of his principles "are given by the notion of a self contained national community."3l) James Woodward argues in favor of applying Rawls' framework to inhabitants of a particular country rather than globally.-�11 Similarly, Stephen Perry notes that the scope of the original position is limited to persons within a single society, The first p roblem with Perry's argument is that it raises the ques tion of whether a world in which countries engage in international trade in goods, services, ca p ital, and labor is a "coo p erative venture fo r mutual advantage.··-�_ , If so, then the world is a "society" in which all individuals would be p arties to the original p osition.-�-� Under this theory, by choosing to coo p erate, we take on obligations of justice toward one another.
There is. however, a dee p er p roblem inherent in making obliga tions of justice contingent on voluntary acts of coo p eration. This a pp roach allows us to avoid obligations of justice by refusing to coo p erate with disfavored grou p s. If we im p ose a boycott or embargo against aliens, then we owe them no ex p lanation in terms of justice. This a pp roach reconciles discrimination against aliens with egaiitarian p rinci p les of social justice only by fi at: it assumes the result rather than deriving itY We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do not coo p erate with aliens. As the exam p le of immigration p olicy demonstrates. the question of which individuals we choose as p artners in coo p eration is itself an o p en question of p ublic p olicy that we may want to answer using our p rinci p les of justice. If we make obligations of justice contingent on whether we coo p erate in the first p lace, then this normative framework becomes a function of our p olicies and cannot work as an inde p endent standard that we can use to evaluate these p olicies. Our analysis becomes circular: we are justified in discriminating against aliens in em p loyment p recisely because our refusal to hire them relieves us of obligations of justice. Such a theory begs the question of whether our choice of partners is itself justifi able.�() Only the global interpretation of the original position offers a satisfactory fr amework for the evaluation of our immigration policies under a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. This cosmopolitan perspective is the only interpretation of the original position that is faithful to "the underlying spirit of Rawls' theory," which "is ani mated by the underlying idea of eliminating or compensating for ·morally arbitrary' differences between people. "47 Cosmopolitan liberals note that ''the fact that one is an inhabitant of one particular country rather than another ... is a paradigmatic example of the sort of 'morally arbitrary' fact that the method of the original position is designed to abstract from."�� To restrict the scope of our theory of justice based on such morally arbitrary facts undermines our claim to a liberal egalitarian theory of justice.
Nevertheless. Woodward seeks to justify this restriction on the origi nal position by pointing to "real world facts about people's actual motivation and non-ideal behaviour."�<) He notes that "very extensive immigration rights .. . are not rights that people in affluent countries would be motivated to act in accordance with or to respect, once they take up their places in such societies" and concludes that ·· [r]ecognizing this, the parties to a global contract would not agree to such rights. "')II These political realities, Woodward argues, constrain the theory of justice that emerges from the original position.
Woodward's appeal to realism, however, confuses the ideal and non-ideal parts of a theory of justice. Rawls explains that his "main concern" is with the ideal theory, which "assumes strict compliance" and describes '·a perfectly just basic structure" under "favorable circumstances." :'! "Existing institutions are to be judged in light of -l-11. Thus. the fact that cooperation is feasible should be sufficient to require the inclusion or a pros p ecti\e partv to the original position. See Charles B eitz. Co.lmotJo!iwn ldeuls and . YI IIionu! St'nliill('/1{. :-\() J. PHIL. )l)l. 5l)5 ( ll)8:1) (arguing that otherwise. "limiting the scope or the principle s to national 'ocieties on the grounds that international cooperation dncs not exist todav ... would mbitrarily favor the status quo").
-l-7. Woodward. '" l 'ro note -!-0. at 80-81.
!n this sense. Rawls' failure to cxtenu his principles globallv is .. �ln ud ll!n move . . . inconsistent with the underlying egalitarian spir it" of his thcorv. !d. at 76. !M:VIfGRA T!ON AND THE WO RKPLA CE 3(11 this conception and held to be unj ust to the extent that they depart from it without sufficient reason. "52 The non-ideal theory ''is worked out after an ideal conception of justice has been chosen: only then do the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy condi tions. "53 The non-ideal theory takes account of "historical contingen cies" and ''injustice " in existing social arrangements. 54 Thus, if we understand our proj ect as the formulation of an ideal theory, then the popularity of policies deemed unjust under that theory is no reason to revise our theory to uphold those policies instead.
If we apply Woodward's approach to our ideal theory of justice, then we make the theory vulnerable to capture by popular prejudice and undermine its capacity for a critical evaluation of the status quo. By taking actual non-ideal behavior as given, Woodward imparts a conservative bias to the original position. Carrying this approach to its logical conclusion, we would conclude that the parties to the original position could only endorse existing arrangements. Such an ideal theory would fail to serve its function, which is to provide a standard by which to judge existing institutions.
Carens suggests that a ·'realistic" approach to morality in seventeenth-or eighteenth-century America "would perhaps have led one to articulate a morality for slaveholders, rather than calling into question the institution of slavery and demanding its abolition. "5' He notes that "any moral view of slavery was flawed and inadequate if it did not start from the recognition that slavery was fundamentally evil and unj ust" and that "[ a]ny satisfactory moral view had to have abolition as its ultimate goal. "'11 A realist account would be flawed and unsatisfactory in two possible senses. First, Carens may mean that it vv ould simply fail to describe moral truth and therefore would be a false moral theory. Second, a realist account might be inade quate because it would fa il to advance the cause of justice over the long term. That is, by legitimating the status quo, the realist would fail to promote more enlightened attitudes and thus would stall progress toward more just policies.57 In co n tra s t "[a]pproaching moral questions from an idealistic perspective avoids legitimating policies and practices that are morally wrong and gives the fullest scope to our critical capacities.''-'� If we allow the realist perspective to displace our ideals, then we breed complacency regarding the morality of the status quo. Robert Goodin suggests that morality may sometimes require us to advocate "unrealistic" options:
[I]f the only reason the options are unrealistic is that people are unwilling to make sacrifices that they could and arguably should in pursuit of morally important goals, then those options should be very much on the table. The proper role of politics, in such circum stances, is precisely not to 'be realistic' and accept uncritically peo ple's unwillingness to make morally proper sacrifices. It is, rather, to persuade them that moral ideals are wort h pursuing.59
In this sense, according to Carens, "ideal theory holds up the princi ple of free migration as an essential part of the just social order toward which we should strive. ''r.o Woodward objects that "as we abstract away from real world facts ... the relevance of the (ideal) principles and institutions that would emerge from such an idealized original position to what \V e should do in the actual non-ideal world ... becomes progressively less clear. "r.1 He asks what this ideal theory implies "about how nations should behave in the actual world, which is very far from conforming to these ideal arrangements?"62 Woodward is right to ask what practical implications this ideal theory has for our non-ideal world even if he is wrong to suggest that we should rej ect an ideal theory because it is unrealistic. What good are the prescriptions of ideal theory if there is no real chance that we would actual ly adopt the prescribed policies? With Woodward's question in mind, let us next turn to the perspective that he might consider more relevant from a realist perspective. 
II. IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC WELFARE
Our immigration laws are usually justified based on an assump tion that we may privilege individuals born into those favored classes entitled to U.S. citizenship upon birth under our nationality laws.n3 Thus, the discrimination explicit in our laws derives from an implicit assumption regarding the unequal status of persons based on nativity. This assumption is one sense in which our immigration and national ity laws violate our ideals of equal concern for all persons.
There is also a second sense, however, in which these laws violate our liberal ideals. To illustrate this point, consider the following thought experiment. For the sake of argument, suppose we grant the premise that we are entitled to favor the interests of natives over those we designate as aliens based on circumstances of birth. I adopt this nativist perspective strictly as a theoretical exercise, not because I believe that our immigration policies should be guided solely by the interests of natives, but because such concerns have in fact played a dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy and are commonly thought to provide the strongest case in favor of restrictive immigration laws. vV e might adopt this nativist perspective as a concession to politi cal realities.(). ) National governments, including that of the United States, will likely continue to deem the promotion of the interests of natives as the paramount obj ective of immigration policies. It may be politically infeasible to ask natives to set aside their collective self interest in formulating our immigration laws. This non-ideal feature of the real world may impose a constraint on the set of policy alterna tives open to us as a practical matter.
Furthermore, many observers believe that the pursuit of national self-interest is justified as a moral matter. "Realists find it morally acceptable that we should prefer the interests of our own collective to 63. See. e. g .. S. REP. No. lJi'\-62. at 3 (llJ�3) ("[T] he paramount obligation of any nation's gove rnment . indeed the very reason fnr its existence and the justification for its power . is to promote the national interest-the long-term we lfare of the majority of its citizens and their desct:nd.:� n ts . .. ) .
n<-f. As Seidman observes . the limitations 1mposed by "bounded caring fare] like it or not. ... facb that exist in the world .. and "unlikely to change more than marginally in the near fu ture .
. . so that any "real-world immigration policy must ... take account of these facts and work around them .
. . Seidmiln . sur m note.: )7. at l-ID.
those of mankind in general .... "h� From this standpoint, an analysis of the effe cts of immigration restrictions on the interests of natives is directly relevant to the determination of the ideal immigration policy. This perspective need not ignore the interests of aliens entirely, but may justify some discrimination against aliens by giving priority to natives. Perry, for example, argues that "[t]here is ... an upper limit on the self-sacrifice that liberal states can demand of their citizens, and ... this limit will apply to the treatment of outsiders. "611 Specifi cally. he suggests that '' [s]tates may demand that ... immigrants not be a burden on society, and even that they be capable of making a positive contribution. "67
Can we justify our immigration restrictions using this criterion? In particular, does the exclusion of aliens mandated by our immigra tion laws actually promote the economic interests of natives, as restrictionists claim? Does the promotion of the economic welfare of natives call for these immigration restrictions? The fo llowing analysis suggests that the answer to these questions, as they are normally understood. is no. We would deem our immigration restrictions to be ideal public policies from the perspective of natives only if we are prepared to count the satisfaction of segregationist preferences as elements of social welfare. It is in this sense that immigration restric tions violate our liberal ideals even if we assume arguendo that national welfare is appropriate as our policy objective.
A.
Effects of Immigration in the Labor Market
If we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market. we fi nd that the natives of the host country, taken together, will gain
\,] (1\T!\IE\T. S//fi/"!1 no t e l:'i. Ci t 21.3. 21-J.-l:'i: I( 'C id. al n:; c·[T]he collective we ll-be ing of our own st<•tc·. <1 nd or th�· individuals who compose it. ought to have a greater we i gh t in our mora l <lccuunt•ng thcm thc '.\ ell-being of tbusl� outside the community ... ) .
1>6 . PL·rrv. supru note ..J.J. at 10"\.
tJ7. !d. <�t llllJ. Thus. Pe rry does not suggest that we seek to maximize the benefits derived tw natives from immigran ts. Natives could extract the maximum be nefit from i mmigrants by im p osi n g a Lari!t on them and thereby raising e. \tra ta\ revenue from immigrants. See Howard F. Chang. /_iiwmli::.ct! !u unigrution 11.1 Fr<'c [rude: Econumic 'v\ld.fi1re 111111 rlze Op timal flllmigru1ion P1 •/ic; . l-t:' U. PA. L REV. ! l..J.7 . J 1:'\7-05 ( llJlJ7 ) ( an a lyzing the o p t i ma l tari ff on immi grant>. ctssuming tha t natives scek to maximize their own economic welfare ). The criterion Pcrrv suggests would not go so fa r as to demand the maximum contribution fro m an imm igrant:
tl<; unl•: "sks that the contribution be positive:.
from the immigration of labor. h· ' 'vV ages may fa ll fo r native workers who compete with immigrant labor, but this loss for workers is a pure transfer among natives: it is offset by an equal gain for those who employ labor, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods and services at lower cost.h'� Furthermore, natives gain from employing immigrant workers: they gain surplus in excess of what they pay immigrants for their labor.711 If they did not gain any surplus from employing immigrants, they would not hire them. Thus, natives as a group enjoy a net gain.71 Labor migration represents a form of international trade in which the source country exports labor to the host country.72 Like international trade in goods. labor migration allows foreign suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers, allowing both parties to enjoy gains from trade as a result of the transaction.
Effects on Native \Y orkers: Empirical Evidence
We may be concerned, of course, with the distribution of income among natives. Immigration not only expands wealth, but also can have important distributive effects. Those natives who must compete with immigrants in the labor market may find that immigration reduces their real income.7' Thus, countries often restrict immigration to protect native workers from the unemployment or the wage reductions that the entry of foreign workers would supposedly entail.
Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets, how ever, have shown little evidence of effects on native wages or em- 
73. Sl'e NRC. supm note 6::->. at 130-40.
ployment_i-1 A survey of this empirical literature indicates that immigration has a weak effect on the employment of nativesY Furthermore, the evidence indicates a weak relationship between native wages and immigration across all types of native workers, white or black, skilled or unskilled.7h
Why do immigrants have so little adverse impact on the wages and employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for labor does not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immi grant workers not only supply labor. for example, they also demand goods and services, and this demand will translate into greater demand for locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can offset the effect of increased supply.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants and natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market.77 Thus, immigrants often do not compete for the same jobs as natives. Indeed, immigrant labor can be a complement rather than a substi tute for native labor, so that an increase in the supply of immigrant labor will increase the demand for native labor and thus have positive effects on native workers rather than negative effects. In fact, labor markets are highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in some occupations while natives are concentrated in others.7�' If only immigrant workers take certain jobs, then natives can gain from immigration in these markets without any adverse effect on the wages of native workers. IVI oreover. if native workers can move into jobs where their competitive advantage (in English language skills, for example) provides a natural barrier to competition from immigrants, then they can enjoy the benefits of immigration and still avoid any adverse effects of immigration in the labor market. Thus, segmented labor markets imply that immigration can produce gains for natives in the labor market without necessarily producing adverse effects for native workers. It is important to interpret claims in the literature in light of the empirical evidence of segmented labor markets.
For example, George Borj as, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz produce one of the largest estimates of the effect of immigrants on native wages.7� They estimate that immigration between 1980 and 1995 accounted for 44 percent of the 11 percent decline in the relative wages of high school dropouts in the United States during this period. K o Those who advocate restrictive immigration policies have seized upon this study to support their claims of adverse effects on unskilled native workers, and its conclusions have therefore been widely cited by restrictionists in current debates over immigration reform.x1 Yet at most, the study suggests that immigration restrictions benefit the shrinking minority of native workers with less than a high school education. K 2 More important, this study uses a questionable methodology.
Borj as, Freeman, and Katz derive their estimates from a simulation that assumes that unskilled immigrants are perfect substitutes for unskilled natives.K� That is, this simulation makes an extreme assump tion regarding the single most important fact in dispute. Therefore, simulations based on this assumption are biased in favor of finding large effects on natives, and thus at best provide only an upper bound on the potential effect of immigration on the wages of unskilled natives.K� 
Income Distribution and the Costs of Protectionism
Even if present levels of immigration have little effect on native wages in the United States, a more liberal immigration policy might produce more significant effects. Indeed, much of the support for current immigration restrictions is protectionist in nature. Restric tionists often cite the need to protect U.S. workers from immigrant competition in the labor market_Kh Li ke trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacrifice gains from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as a group.x7 In this sense, protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth from some natives to others. It is likely that we could redistribute this same wealth through tax policies and transfer programs rather than through protectionism and thereby make all classes of natives better off, because liberalized immigration produces net gains for natives as a group. Thus, concern for the distribution of income among natives does not imply that restrictive immigration laws are in order.
First, concerns regarding income inequality do not justify any re strictions on skilled immigration, because skilled immigrants not only increase total wealth for natives but also promote a more equitable distribution of income among natives. They are likely to have an adverse effect only on competing skilled natives and increase the real wages of everyone else, including less skilled natives, who enjoy the benefits of a greater supply of skilled labor. Therefore, the pursuit of a more equal distribution of income would at most justify concerns regarding unskilled immigration, which could have an adverse effe ct on real wages of unskilled native workers.
Second, even with respect to unskilled immigration. the appro priate response to these distributive concerns is redistribution through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies. not immigra tion restrictions. If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from adverse distributive effects, redistribution is likely to be a less costly solution than protectionism.
If so, then optimal policies would liberalize immigration insofar as it increases the total wealth of natives. As long as immigration increases total wealth, then those who gain from immigration can compensate those who lose and still be better off. That is, those who gain by paying lower wages, or by buying products and services at lower cost. can afford to pay enough to compensate those who find their wages fall relative to prices. Through redistribution, we can attempt to shift the costs of liberalized immigration to the beneficiaries of liberalization.
This redistribution would produce some costly distortions, but the deadweight loss of protectionism would presumably be greater than the deadweight loss from taxes with the same effect on the overall distribution of income. That is, protectionism is presump tively less efficient than the tax system in producing a desirable distribution of income, because protectionism not only produces the distortions associated with redistribution, but also sacrifices the gains from immigration in the labor marker.sx For example, if the immigra- subject to a possible rebuttal in any particular case along the lines suggested by these cntics.
The objections raised by these critics do not imply that protectionism is supe rior to redistri bution through taxes. Chris Sanchirico. for example. notes that a double distortion may he less costly than a single distortion. because " [d] istortions may counteract one another." !d. at 1 ll 17.
There seems to be no reason to think. however. that the distortions associated with protect ion ism mitigate the distortions in work incentives associated with redistribution. Similarly.
Christine Jolls suggests that legal rules may achieve redistribution with less distortion in \V Ork incentives if individual workers bear the cost imposed by the legal rule with only low probability
tion of unskilled workers reduces the wages of unskilled natives. then raising taxes on those workers with higher incomes and reducing taxes on native workers with the lowest incomes could leave all classes of natives better off than they would be in the absence of immigration. K � That is, those classes that would pay higher taxes to compensate unskilled native workers are likely to bear a still heavier burden under the protectionist alternative, which raises the prices of goods and services for all consumers. That is, protectionist policies currently impose an implicit tax on these consumers that probably costs them more than the explicit tax that would be necessary to compensate unskilled native workers for the effects of liberalized immigration policies. Once we recognize that protectionism is merely a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it should be apparent that there is no good reason to favor protectionism over less costly and more efficient transfer policies.
We could achieve redistribution more efficiently and equitably by expanding programs already in use under the existing U.S. tax system. We could make Social Security taxes more progressive, for example, or we could increase the earned income tax credit and liberalize its eligibility requirements.��� These progressive reforms can ami are unduly optimistic. See Christine Jolls. Behuviumf Economics Anulvsis of Redisrrihurivc Legal Rules. 51 YAND. L. REV. 1653 ( 1991\). Insofar as protectionism ultimately transfers wealth through the same channel as the income tax. by changing the worker's after-tax income . .l olls· critique offers no defense for protectionism. Jolls also suggests that if workers treat the cost of a legal rule as an expenditure out of income '"rather than direct charges against income .
.. this mental accounting may reduce distortions in work incentives. !d. at 1670. Insofar as this claim is true about the costs of protectionism. however. at most it would militate in favor of taxes on luxury goods as our redistributive policy. not in favor of protectionist policies that needlessly sacrifice gains from immigration in the labor market.
Finally . Sanchirico also suggests that individuals may be heterogeneous in ways that make legal rules superior to taxes. Sanchirico. supra. at 1057-M: see Chris William Sanchirico. Taxes Versus Legul Rules us lnsrrunzcnrs .fC;r Lifuiry: A AI ore Equirahfe View. 29 J. LECAL ST UD . 797 (2000) . This objection might suggest a defense of immigration restrictions 1f such policies happened to change the incomes. for example. of those with the least elastic supply of labor. There is no reason. however. to think that protectionism targets its transfers in ways that reclucc distortions in work incentives. Nor is there any reason to believe that protectionism targe ts its transfers in ways especially appealing from the perspective of equity. supplement the income of unskilled native workers if unskilled immigration drives down their real wages. This alternative could reduce deadweight loss while still redistributing the same amount of wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism. Evidence that immigration has only mild effects upon the wages of unskilled natives suggests that modest changes in the tax system may be sufficient to offset the distributive effects of liberalized U.S. immigration policies.
These measures would not seek to compensate precisely every single individual affected adversely by liberalization so that immigra tion reform would make literally no one worse off. To insist that these reforms effect a Pareto improvement over the status quo is to set too high a hurdle for reform. Such a requirement would prevent us from implementing virtually any reform in any public policy.
Not only is it infeasible as a practical matter to replicate exactly the redistribution produced by protectionism, it is also not desirable as a normative matter that we do so. We can design progressive tax and transfer policies so that they redistribute income on the basis of morally relevant criteria. whereas the alternative of protectionism distributes its subsidy on a morally arbitrary basis. Protectionism subsidizes the unskilled native who happens to face immigrant competition in the labor market but not the similarly unskilled native who does not. In this sense , protectionism is inferior to tax and transfer policies from the perspective of not only economic efficiency but also horizontal equity.'11
B. Fiscal Effects of Immigration
The presence of transfer policies, however, may r:: use concerns about the effect of immigrants upon the public treasury. Much of the debate over the effects of immigration upon the welfare of natives has focused on the possibility of negative fiscal effects.Y2 Even if concerns about the fiscal costs of immigration were to justify restrictions on unskilled immigration, however, these concerns would not justify any restrictions on the immigration of skilled workers, who tend to have higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of public benefits.
The empirical evidence confirms that educated 91. Thus. protectionism derives no justification from the fact that the transfers that it achieves do not fall on precisely the same individuals as redistributive transfers through the tax system. See supru note 88. immigrants will on average have a net positive effect on natives. taking into account their effects on the public treasury.')3 It would be in the economic interests of U.S. natives to admit skilled workers without protectionist "labor certification" requirements or quantita tive restrictions. The United States should eliminate or liberalize these restrictions.
Fiscal Policies as Less Restrictive Alternatives to Exclusion
Even for unskilled immigrants. the optimal response to fiscal concerns would not be exclusion, but less restrictive alternatives designed to eliminate the fiscal burden that these immigrants impose on natives. That is, if some immigrants have a negative effect on the public sector. the optimal response is not quantitative or other protectionist restrictions on immigration. Rather, the appropriate response is fiscal. Restrictions on alien access to public benefits, for example. can improve the fiscal impact of immigration without excluding un skilled immigrants from the U.S. labor force. Exclusion is the more costly response for both natives and immigrants, because it excludes immigrants not only from our public benefits but also from our labor market and thereby sacrifices the gains from trade that they and we would otherwise enjoy.
The objective of reducing the burden that immigrants impose on natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access LJ.1 . The NRC. for e x a m pl e . fo und that the average immigrant with more than a h igh school education pays e nough in ta xes to p roduce a net fiscal benefit. Sa NRC. supru note fi8. at 33-J.
(Tabk 7.5 ). In fa ct. unce the NRC economists ta k e the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant"s descemlants i nto account. they find that the average immigrant with a high school education pro duces a net surplus of $5 1 .000. a nd the a v e ra ge immigrant with more than a h igh school education producc:s a net s urp l us of $l9i-\.OOO. Set' id. ( reporting net present value of average fi scal impacts in ll JlJh dollars ). A lth o u gh these ligures ··cio not take into account indirect fiscal effects of immigr<t nts arising from any consequences of immigration for the earnings or employment of the existing labor force . ·· the NRC notes that labor market effects on native workers ·· are l i k e ly to he quite s m all and ... could even he positive.·· !d. at 305.
As long as the NRC calc u l a tions .. contain no feedbacks th rough the ge n e ral economy. ·· however. ··they do not reflect diminishing re turns to immigrants as a result of their hypotheti cally incrc:as1ng numbers.·· !d. at 333. An incremental immigrant might drive clown the wages of prior immigrants . for e x amp le. which would reduce the taxes paid by those prior immigrants.
Tak i ng this effe ct into account. however. would not ch ange our conclusion that skilled i m migra nts confer a net economic benefit on natives. Any such reduction in taxes paid by immigrants would be out,veighecl bv the benefit natives enjoy in the labor market by reducing the cost of immigrant labor. A wage reduction of one dollar. for example . would represent a gain to natives as employers or consumers . and the resulting loss of tax revenues would offset only a fra ction of this g ain. If a drop in wages of o ne dollar could reduce tax payments by more than one dollar. then imm i gra nts would enJOY a net benefit from wage reductions and would h ave alre ad y demanded lower wage s in order to e nj oy this fiscal bene fit.
of aliens to various entitlement programs. Current U.S. laws. for example, generally exclude nonimmigrants, including temporary workers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public benefits: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for "any Federal public benefit."�� Current law also includes restrictions on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent resi dents, to federal entitlement programs.l) 5
The National Research Council (''NRC") estimates that by excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits for their first five years in the United States, welfare legislation enacted in 1996 improves the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by $8,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.% Moreover. if the new welfare law has the effects predicted by its proponents. then the positive net fiscal impact of immigration will increase still more: the new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid to individual immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low-income aliens and thereby raise the income of the average immigrant.' n Thus. the NRC's estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration likely understate the fiscal benefits of future immigrants, given the legislation passed by Congress in 1996. Therefore, liberalized immigration is now even more likely to produce net economic benefits for natives.
If immigration liberalization is coupled with expanded redistribu tion of income, however, then it may be necessary to exclude immi grants from these increased transfers.
Otherwise. transfe rs to immigrants could dissipate the economic gains to natives.'�· ' Thus. unskilled immigrants may have a net positive effect on the welfare of natives only if we restrict their access to transfer programs.
Nonimmigrants and Access to Citizenship
Although immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon naturalization, only aliens "admitted for permanent residence .
. may naturalize as U.S. citizens.'�'! Aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas only, including temporary workers. are not admitted as permanent [Vol 78:2Sll residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements and not eligible to naturalize.1un Therefore, even if fiscal concerns justify restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskilled workers, these concerns cannot justify restrictions on their access to nonimmi grant visas. A truly temporary worker, for example, would remain in the United States only while employed and would then return home, imposing even less of a burden on the public treasury than a perma nent resident.111 1 The empirical evidence indicates that immigrants are likely to make a positive contribution to the public treasury through the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and gain access to public benefits.
Ill: '
Thus, temporary workers admitted on nonimmigrant visas, even if unskilled, are likely to have a net positive economic impact on natives, and there is little reason to restrict their entry.
Under current U.S. law, unskilled workers may enter temporarily on H-2A visas for agricultural workers or on H-2B visas for other workers,1113 but both visas are subj ect to labor certification require ments and other protectionist restrictions. 1 114 For example, H-2B visas are limited to 66,000 per year,111 5 and require workers to come "tem porarily to the United States to perform ... temporary service or labor.
"IIIfl
This "double requirement of 'temporariness'" requires the H-2B alien not only to enter temporarily but also to fill a temporary job. 1 117 The liberalization or elimination of these requirements could greatly increase use of these programs. 1 11s As long as we retain the requirement of employer sponsorship, we can ensure that these guest 
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The alternative to a liberalized guest-worker program for many migrant workers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant. In fa ct, employment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the United States has largely taken the form of illegal rather than legal immigration.110 Given that unauthorized immigrants have little access to public entitlements for as long as their presence remains unauthor ized, they may make a positive contribution to public coffers under the fiscal policies currently applied to them. Without distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants, the NRC found that once we take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into account, an immigrant with less than a high school education imposes a net fiscal cost of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.111 If the 1996 welfare legislation excludes immigrants from seven specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant would improve by $8,000. 112 These NRC figures suggest that if an immigrant never has access to such benefits, as would be the case for an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status, then such an immigrant would probably have a positive fiscal impact even if the immigrant were unskilled.
If unauthorized immigrants produce benefits for natives through not only the labor market but also the public sector, then natives have little to gain by imposing sanctions on those who employ unauthor ized immigrants. The repeal of these sanctions would promote the interests of both natives and unauthorized immigrants. Indeed. not only has President Bush recently called for repeal,11 3 but so has organized labor. in a dramatic reversal of its support for employer sanctions since lobbying for their enactment in 1986.11-l Instead. legalization of unauthorized immigrants through a liber alized guest-worker program would serve the interests of these immigrants as well as the interests of natives. The workers would gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life as an unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to deportation by the government and abuse by employers. Furthermore, admission as a guest worker need not entail permanent status as an alien. NRC estimates indicate that the United States could allow even an un skilled immigrant to naturalize without generating a net fiscal burden if a sufficient period of alienage without access to public benefits has passed. In fact, as the Bush administration considers proposals to liberalize our immigration policies, it is currently discussing an expanded guest-worker program that would eventually allow aliens to adjust their status to permanent residence and ultimately naturalize as citizens.11:i C.
Intolerance
So how can we justify our current restrictions on the entry of immigrant workers? It is difficult to see a principled justification for imposing quotas or labor certification requirements upon their immigration. These protectionist barriers do not serve the economic interests of natives as a group.
Perhaps immigration barriers are a second-best response to the concerns of natives when the first-best response is politically infeasi ble.11h In this appeal to realism, as Goodin notes, ''realism serves as an excuse rather than as a justification," and "appealing to that excuse imposes a further obligation, namely, to make very certain that the constraints on doing better really are immutable. "117 If they are not, then our duty is to seek to change those constraints so that vvhat was previously considered politically infeasible becomes possi ble. "Focusing too tightly on second-and third-best options makes us not look closely enough to see whether and how the first-best option might actually be pursued. " 1 1 s
The question then becomes: why is the first-best policy less popu 
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we so quick to blame immigration for our problems and eager to seize upon immigration restriction as the appropriate response? For example, why do advocates for unskilled native workers lobby successfully for immigration restrictions rather than for more redistri bution through the tax system? If opposition to redistribution makes expanded transfers politically infeasible, then why is this opposition any less vocal or any less effective against immigration restrictions that achieve the same redistribution at higher cost? Immigration restrictions, after alL do a worse job of serving the interests of natives than more efficient transfer policies.''L)
We can fi nd at least part of the explanation for the popularity of immigration restrictions in the preferences of natives regarding the ethnic or racial composition of the U.S. population and thus its labor force. Almost since their inception, federal immigration restrictions have reflected concerns regarding the race and ethnicity of immi grants.12 1 1 Soon after Congress began to regulate immigration in 1875Y' it enacted the Chinese Exclusion ActY2 only the first in a series of laws restricting the immigration of Chinese laborers.121 Subsequent laws reflected anxiety regarding not only Asian immigra tion but also immigration from eastern and southern Europe. In 1921, Congress enacted the first quantitative restrictions on immigra tion, creating a national origins quota system that skewed the alloca tion of visas toward aliens from northern and western Europe.12� Given this history of racism and xenophobia, it would be naive to assume that intolerance does not continue to provide political support for immigration restrictions in general. Indeed, restrictionist authors like Peter Brimelow are quite explicit in their expressions of alarm regarding the racial complexion of the immigrant stream into the United States.12" The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the pervasive influence of xenophobia in the formulation of our public policies in pee . -Does this explanation for the popularity of immigration restric tions provide a justification? We might seek to interpret the ''inter ests'' of natives broadly to include the satisfaction of their preferences regarding the ethnic or racial composition of the U.S. population. 1 27 It is telling. however, that we normally reject intolerant preferences as justifications for employment discrimination.12� A reliance on prefer ences for the ethnic status quo to justify our immigration laws would underscore the second sense in which our immigration laws violate our liberal antidiscrimination principles.
Restrictionists might respond that their preference is neither rac ist nor xenophobic, but simply a preference for associating with workers most like themselves.
Perhaps the restrictionist simply prefers to be surrounded by workers who share the same culture and the same values and fears becoming surrounded by those who seem foreign and unfamiliar. But can we distinguish this associational preference from intolerance -the desire not to encounter those who are different? Would the desire of an employer or its employees to maintain a white workplace, because they prefer its homogeneous culture or simply value the familiar status quo, justify the exclusion of racial minorities? 126 . .:1-03 U.S. 365. 372 (ll)71). Thc author of the Gmh{{m opinion would later explain that ··aliens often have been the victims of irrational discrimination" and "historically have been disabled by the prejudice of the majority." which led ··the? Court to conclude that alienage classifications ·in themselves supply a re<lson to inkr antipathy' ... and therefore demand close judicial scrutiny." Toll v. Moreno. 45S U.S. l. 20-2 1 (Blackmun. L concurring) (quoting Personnel Aclm'r v. Feeney . .:1-42 U.S. 256. 272 (ll)7l))). The Cru!zwn Court struck down state laws conditioning access to welfare benefits on either U.S. citizenship or residence in the United States for a specified number of years. Recognizing the tension between the Cruhulll reasoning and federal immigration restrictions. however. the Court would later re fuse to apply the same scrutiny to federal laws discriminating against aliens. Sr:c Mathews v. Diaz . .:1-26 U.S. n7. Sl-S7 ( ll)76 ).
127. See Chang. supru note 67. at 1210-2 1. We might count the satisfaction of these racist or xenophobic preferences an element of the welfare of these natives. If our objectives include the regulation of the racial compiexiUn of the labor force. then immigration restrictions serve that objective we ll by excluding most people of color m the world from access to our labor market. If the exclusion of foreigne1·s is itself our objective. then a policy of exclusion vielcls a perfect fit with that objective. From this perspective. immigration restriction would be a first-best policy. not merely a second-best policy.
12S. Sr:e OWORKI:'\. sup ru note 2!. at 2.'4-:0S (arguing that a calculation of social welfare should exclude intolerant preferences if it is to justify a public policv): Howard F. Chang. If we would reject such associational preferences as a reason to exclude minorities from a single workplace, then why should we accept them as a reason to exclude people from all the workplaces in the entire country. where the claim of an impact on one's personal associational interests seems far more remote and tenuous? Even if we identify legitimate associational interests that do not derive from intolerance, it seems difficult to explain why we must protect these interests through employment discrimination mandated by the government on a national scale rather than through the less restrictive alternative of voluntary employment discrimination. If we consider these associational preferences to be legitimate, then why not simply allow employers to discriminate on the basis of national origin rather than mandating such discrimination by law? Indeed, our liberal ideals impose principles of neutrality on the state that do not apply to the individual. Under this political theory, a liberal state cannot justify discriminatory laws by endorsing one particular conception of the good, for example, by favoring one particular religion, whereas individuals are left free to pursue their own conceptions of the good using their own private resources.12l) Thus. even if we consider individuals free to discriminate within some private sphere based on ethnicity or cultural traits, these preferences cannot provide a justification within our liberal framework for discrimination imposed by the coercive powers of the state.130 I.29. Se!' ACKERviAN . . \lif!ril noie 3:-\. at ll (suggesting that in a liberal state. no one can justify a legal regime by claiming that "his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fe llow citizens" ): RAWLS . su p ra note It\. at 44S (suggesting that in ''a well-ordered society .... the plans of life of individuals are different in the sense that these plans give prominence to diffe r• .: nt aims. and persons are left free to determine their good").
130. See Carens. su p m note .22 . at 2AS ("When the state acts it must treat individuals equally."). Ackerman suggests that the only legitimate reason for a liberal state to restrict Immigration is to protect the liberal state itself. Sci' ACKER'viAN. su p ra note 38. at 95 ("The only reason for restrict ing immigration is to protect the ongoing process of liberal conversation itself."). Similarly. Perry notes that the admission of "a large number of persons from groups espousing illiberal or undemocratic principles ... might. 1f admitted on a sufficiently large scale. pose a real risk to the existence ur character of a liberal democracy." Perry. su p ra note 41. at Il-l. This observation. however. fa ils to JUStify the restrictions we currently impose on immigration. See id. ("[l] t would presumably take a manyfold increase in the levels of immigration to ... the United States or Canada before such a risk could be regarded as anything more than a theoretical possibility."). Furt htermore . we reduce this risk if we admit aliens as guest-workers with restricted access to citizenship rather than as permanent residents who will ultimatelv naturalize and \'Ok. Will Kymlicka. on the other hand. argues that "some limits on immigration can he justified if we recognize th<1t liberal states exist. not only to protect standard rights and opportunities of inclivicluals. but also to protect people's cultural membership." Instead, we are reluctant to satisfy these preferences explicitly through regulation by the state. Indeed, in 1965 we abolished the infamous national origins quota system because we recognized the illegitimacy of preferences for particular ethnic groupsY' How then can the preservation of the ethnic or cultural status quo be any more acceptable as a reason for us to restrict immigration generally? Unless we consider the ethnic purity of our labor force to be a public good. it is hard to rationalize the employment discrimination man dated by our immigration restrictions as serving the national interest. Thus. this employment discrimination against aliens, like the forms of discrimination traditionally considered invidious. not only denies the victims of discrimination equal concern but is also difficult to justify as an ideal practice unless we appeal to illiberal preferences. To the extent that these intolerant preferences help explain the enduring popularity of immigration restrictions despite the costs of these policies, this explanation underscores the illiberal nature of the discrimination produced by these restrictions.
Intolerant preferences, however illegitimate, can impose real constraints on the feasibility of liberalized immigration policies. just as the general self-interest of natives may impose such constraints. Nevertheless, we might plausibly view these preferences as more amenable to reform than the tendency of natives to pursue their own self-interest. The evolution of attitudes in the United States toward ethnic groups once greeted with hostility offe rs hope that more tolerant attitudes will eventually prevail with respect to those who currently dominate the immigrant flow. Perhaps the process of immigration itself will promote acceptance of these newer waves of immigrants, much as integration ultimately brought more enlightened attitudes regarding Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigration. Indeed, spurred in part by the increasing political infl uence of the Hispanic immigrant population in the United States, current discussions of immigration reform have raised hopes fo r more open policies in the near future, further underscoring the feasibility of liberalizationY2 There may be other factors contributing to the popularity of im migration restrictions and standing in the way of reform. For exam ple, part of the problem may simply be the failure of the public to understand the costs of protectionism, which imposes an implicit tax on natives hidden as increases in the prices of goods and services. This failure to appreciate the economic effects of misguided policies. however, does not offer a justification for such policies. If these popular misconceptions were immutable. it could also impose con straints on the feasibility of liberalized immigration policies, just as the general self-interest of natives may restrict the set of politically feasible immigration policies. It seems plausible, however, to assume that these misconceptions are more amenable to change through education than the constraints imposed by the self-interest of natives. It is especially the role of scholars and educators not to take popular myths as given but instead to seek to promote a more enlightened understanding of the effects of public policies.
Ill. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND SECOND-BEST POLICIES
So what are we to make of the fo regoing analysis? What are the normative implications for immigration policy? Cosmopolitan liberal ideals generally condemn discrimination against aliens. Even theories that allow us to privilege the interests of natives over those of aliens cannot justify employment discrimination against aliens as ideal policy, 1-'-� unless we count the satisfaction of illiberal preferences as a reason to adopt immigration restrictions.
Excluding the satisfaction of segregationist preferences from our notion of social welfare. the welfare of natives would at most justify discrimination against unskilled alien workers in fiscal policies, such as restricted access to public benefits, and in terms of access to citizenship. There is little justification for employment discrimination against aliens, given the alternative of redistribution among natives through taxes and transfer programs. From the narrow perspective of the economic interests of natives, temporary worker visas may be an optimal response to fiscal concerns regarding alien access to public benefits. Through guest-worker programs. natives enjoy the benefits 133. Thus. President Bush defends suggestions lor im1mgration reform with a focus on a liberalized labor market. stating: .. [ Wj he n we fi nd willing employer and willing emplovee. we ought to match the two. We ought to make it easier for people who want to employ som ebody.
who are looking for workers. to be able to hire people who want to work.·· Edwin Chen & Jonathan Peterson. Buslz fiinrs ur Broader /\ nuu:.l£_1". L.A. T!\IES. July 27. 201l l. at A!.
Cf-1/CA CO-KEVF U\ \V REVIEW [Vol 7�:2LJ1 of unskilled alien workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of providing the full set of public benefits that these workers would enjoy if they were to gain access to permanent resi dence and ultimately citizenship.
From the perspective of the interests of aliens. or from the per spective of cosmopolitan liberal principles of social justice. however. these guest-worker programs are only second-best policies. From these perspectives, the ideal policy may be legal permanent residence. access to citizenship. and access to all public benefits. The self-interest of natives. however. is bound to impose constraints of political feasibility on the availability of immigrant visas. The empiri cal evidence suggests that unskilled alien workers are likely to have a net negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to permanent residence and ultimately citizenship. As long as natives are limited in their willingness to bear these fiscal burdens. they are likely to restrict alien access to permanent residence. either through quantitative restrictions or through qualitative restrictions that establish demand ing criteria for eligibility.1�4 These constraints are likely to exclude many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market unless they either are willing to immigrate illegally or have access to guest-worker visas.
Given such political constraints on access to permanent resi dence, guest-worker programs may represent the only alternative to illegal immigration for aliens otherwise excluded from the U.S. labor market.t. '" Thus, such programs promote the welfare of not only natives but also aliens. compared to the politically feasible alterna tives: we should liberalize access to these programs by liberalizing or eliminating labor certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions on the duration of guest workers' employment or on their stays in the United States. We should also remove restrictions on the types of employment that these guest workers may take, so that aliens are free to seek any job in the United States, and all sectors of the U.S. economy can benefi t from hiring them. Current discussions of an expanded guest-work er program envision liberalization beyond the agricultural sector,1-'h which would represent at least a step in the right direction.
The protection of the interests of natives does not require many of the restrictions currently imposed on guest workers.1-'7 There is no need. for example. to restrict the alien's freedom to move from one employer to another or from one sector of the economy to another. Like immigration restrictions, restrictions on mobility between jobs are economically inefficient as well as unduly burdensome for the worker subj ect to the restriction. Freedom to leave an employer and to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to assert their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses, without destroying the gains from trade that natives enj oy from employing alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats in Congress have urged that a reformed guest-worker policy include the freedom to change employersYs A proposal including at least this reform appears likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations between the United States and MexicoY') We can also fortify the guest worker's incentives to complain about abuses with protections against em-135. Sl.'c JULI;\N L. Sii\.10"1. THE ECONOivi iC CONSEOL ENCcS OF L\l :v t !CiRAT ION 302�03. 310 ( lLJSLJ) (arguing that a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusion): Chang. supru note o 7. at l!LJ2�LJ4 (same): sec ulso Seidman. supra note 57. a l !43 ("Why should anyone believe that a guest worker is ·e x ploi t ed· when he receives higher wages and more protection in the program than he would receive if he remained in his home country·)"). ployer retaliation for whistleblowers_ or even bounties or other rewards for those who make meritorious claims that their employers are violating the rights of employees.1-l 1 1
At the same time, we must reduce or eliminate the protectionist barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship, such as labor certification. These liberalizing reforms are especially essential if we make the employee's visa more portable. Employers will be reluctant to invest much time or money in sponsoring a worker's visa if the worker is then free to leave to work for a competing employer who can thereby take a free ride on the sponsoring employer's investment in the visa.
We might also allow unskilled guest workers to adj ust their status to permanent residence without imposing a net burden on natives if appropriate conditions are met. Mexico has urged the United States to allow guest workers to remain permanently, and a proposal includ ing some sort of access to permanent residence may yet emerge from negotiations between the two countries.1-l1 The conditions for adjust ment of status might include, for example, a sufficiently lengthy period of residence and employment as a guest worker without a criminal record, as well as payment of a sufficient amount in taxes over this period.1-l2
In any event, a guest-worker program would not produce a he reditary class of alien residents in the United States because the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives U.S. citizen ship to anyone born in the United States, including the children of nonimmigrants.1-�� Thus, guest-worker programs in the United States cannot create the type of caste society that they might in countries that do not provide this birthright citizenship. Furthermore, citizen ship for the children of immigrants has proven to be consistent with the national economic interest. as the available evidence indicates !Mi\11/GRA T!ON AND THE WORKPLACE that the descendants of even unskilled immigrants have a positive fiscal impact, even taking into account the cost of public education.1�J
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker's resi dence and employment in the United States, however, the program raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with only re stricted access to citizenship.1�" Liberal objections to this prospect help explain some of the political resistance to expansion of these guest-worker programs. Woodward objects that ''[t)he creation of a class of permanent residents who are restricted from becoming citizens (if they should wish to do so) or any similar system of differ ential status among a state's permanent inhabitants is fu ndamentally incompatible with liberal egalitarian ideals. "t�n As Carens and others have argued, however, the exclusion of aliens is also incompatible with these ideals.147 If political realities require us to choose between these two departures from our liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can Woodward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the alien as well as on natives?
Ironically , Woodward himself notes that if we act against a ''background of non-ideal institutions and behaviour" in a world "in which large numbers of people and institutions fail to do what justice requires,'' we may ''acquire obligations which are different from those [we] would acquire under more perfectly just institutional arrange ments. "1�� As Woodward states the theory of the second-best:
[t is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is obliga tory (or even a good thing) to do P under ideal, utopian circum stances. then it is also obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P under the actual circumstances, no matter how far they may diffe r from the ideal.1�l)
Goodin notes that ''[t)here is much to be said for the realist argument that insists upon ''the importance of not making a fetish of moral ideals," because "doing the best you can in an imperfect world may well require you to compromise any (indeed, all) of your moral [Vol 7�:2l)1 ideals" and a "[f] ailure to take due account of the probable reactions of others can ... have consequences that are truly catastrophic." 15 11
Woodward advances realist claims in defense of immigration re strictions, but as we have seen. they could more plausibly justify restrictions on alien access to public benefits and to citizenship. Indeed. Woodward himself notes that ''it is far from obvious that it would be wrong ... to limit eligibility for social welfare programmes to citizens or long-term residents, if failure to do so would jeopardize the continued existence of such programmes. "151 We might say the same about restrictions on alien access to public benefits and citizen ship if these restrictions are necessary to make politically feasible the alien's access to our labor market and the alien's admission in the first place.
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal alternatives, both of which fall short of our moral ideals. In this regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over deonto logical theories. Under a teleological theory, "those institutions and acts are right which of the available alternatives produce the most good. "152 Once we specify the good. then a teleological theory can provide a complete ranking of all alternatives, including non-ideal alternatives.153 Deontological theories, which do not maximize a good specified in advance,15-l may not readily provide a ranking of non-ideal alterna tives.'55
We might, for example, specify the good as an appropriate meas ure of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of preferences but excluding those preferences that violate our liberal principles of equality. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has proposed such a teleo logical theoryY6 If we apply this type of consequentialism and adopt a cosmopolitan perspective, then a guest-worker program represents the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclu sion. Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its distribution, whereas a guest-worker program would improve social welfare on both counts. From this perspective, liberal opposition to guest-worker policies is harmful and misguided, because the alterna tive of exclusion raises even worse moral problems from the perspec tive of our liberal principles of equality.
Exclusion may benefit some workers in the country of immigra tion, but only at the expense of others in the country of immigration and at the expense of alien workers who are even worse off than the beneficiaries of the policy of exclusion. Thus, the employment discrimination implied by a policy of exclusion is difficult to justify from a cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are poorer than the workers who are privileged by this discriminatory regime. From this perspective, redistribution designed to compensate the workers adve rsely affected by immigration may itself bring about a desirable reduction in global inequality or may be necessary to soften the political opposition to liberalized immigration, but this redistribution is not strictly necessary for immigration liberalization to be an improvement over the status quo. In terms of cosmopolitan liberal ideals, the increase in global welfare and the improvement in its distribution created by liberalization itself would be sufficient to justify liberalization whether or not transfers compensate native workers for the erosion of the privileged status conferred by restric tionist policies.
CONCLUSION
The employment discrimination against aliens implied by our immigration restrictions is difficult to justify, whether we adopt the cosmopolitan perspective or instead embrace less egalitarian liberal ideals and favor the interests of natives over those of aliens. Consid erations of both global economic welfare and national economic welfare militate in favor of liberalized alien access to our labor markets. In the case of skilled aliens, the United States can lift restrictions on the employment of aliens consistent with the national interest by liberalizing access to employment-based immigrant visas for skilled workers. In the case of unskilled aliens, however, the optimal policy from the perspective of the interests of natives departs significantly from the policy prescribed by cosmopolitan ideals. While the employment discrimination implied by our immigration restrictions remains difficult to justify , some discrimination against unskilled aliens in the distribution of public benefits and in access to citizenship may serve the interests of natives. These considerations militate in favor of guest-worker programs as policies that provide access to our labor markets without necessarily providing full access to the transfers provided to citizens.
While guest-worker programs may be ideal from the perspective of the economic welfare of natives, they are only second-best policies from the cosmopolitan perspective . The cosmopolitan liberal would prefer that aliens have access to both our labor market and ready access to public benefits and citizenship. As a matter of political reality. however, natives are unlikely to admit aliens under those generous conditions in the numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would require, given the fiscal burden that those liberal policies would entail. Given this constraint of political feasibility, cosmopolitan liberals face a trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor markets for unskilled alien workers will likely require some restric tions in access to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic chance of enactment.
From a consequentialist perspective that extends equal concern to aliens and natives, guest-worker programs are less unj ust than the status quo alternative of exclusion. Reforms that reduce employment discrimination against aliens should prove feasible, even while eliminating all discrimination against aliens remains an unrealistic ideal. Therefore, I have suggested, cosmopoli tan liberals should support liberalizing reforms that include guest worker programs , even while seeking the broadest rights possible fo r aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While it would be a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal egalitarian perspective, it would also be a mistake to sacrifice worth while reforms because they fall short of the ideal.
